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Repression of Kazakh Intellectuals
as a Sign of Weakness of Russian
Imperial Rule
The paradoxical impact of Governor A.N. Troinitskii on the Kazakh
national movement*
La répression des intellectuels kazakhs ou la faiblesse de l’administration directe
russe  : l’impact paradoxal du gouverneur A.N. Trojnickij sur le mouvement
national kazakh
Tomohiko Uyama
1 Although bureaucracy as an ideal type in Max Weber’s concept is a form of impersonal
rule, the personality of individual bureaucrats often influences the actual handling of
administrative matters.  While this holds true for today’s developed countries,  it  held
particularly so for tsarist Russia. In the Russian Empire’s regions, governors‑general and
governors,  entrusted  by  the  will  of  the  emperor  to  guard  the  inviolability  of  the
autocracy’s sovereign rights,1 held discretionary administrative and judicial powers. They
themselves often tried to carry out policies marked by their individuality. In the history
of  Russian  Central  Asia,  it  is  well  known  that  Konstantin  von  Kaufman,  the  first
governor‑general of Turkestan (1867‑1882), dubbed “half‑tsar” by the local population,
behaved as a highly authoritarian, patriarchic and at the same time enlightening ruler,
while  his  successor  Mikhail Cherniaev (1882‑1884)  tried in  vain to  negate  everything
Kaufman did.2 One may suppose that this kind of situation occurred typically right after
the  conquest  and  administration  became  more  systematized  later,  but  this  paper
demonstrates that personal factors in regional administration of Central Asia were still
strong in the last years of tsarism, although of a different character than in the Kaufman
era.
2 Among the objects of power exercised by governors were political and social activists,
whose  ranks  mainly  included  intellectuals.3 Studying  the  history  of  the  Kazakh
intelligentsia,  we noticed that a number of prominent intellectuals who later became
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leaders  of  the  national  movement, such  as  Akhmet Baytŭrsïnov  (1873‑1937),
Yaqub Aqbaev  (1876‑1934),  Kölbay Tögísov  (1879‑1919),  and  Mir‑Yaqub Dulatov
(1885‑1935),  were arrested in Semipalatinsk oblast  around 1910.  While persecution of
Kazakh activists took place in various regions after the Revolution of 1905, it took an
especially  harsh  character  in  this  oblast.  When  searching  the  reasons  for  this
phenomenon, we came across a unique person, Governor Aleksandr Troinitskii.4
3 Troinitskii was born in 1869 to an aristocratic family of elite officials. His father, Nikolai
Aleksandrovich Troinitskii (1842‑1913), after working as governor in Viatka and Riazan
provinces, served as director of the central statistical committee and chairman of the
statistical council at the Ministry of the Interior. He is known to historians as the editor
of  the  volumes  resulting  from  the  first  (and  only)  Russian  Empire  Census  of  1897.
Grandfather Aleksandr Grigor´evich Troinitskii (1807‑1871) was also a famous statistician
who played a leading role in the development and reorganization of statistical agencies
during  Russia’s  Great  Reforms,  and  served  as  deputy  minister  of  the  Interior.5 As
Don Rowney argues, statistics was one of the most important instruments of legibility
(the  modern  state’s  detailed  grasp  of  the  social,  demographic  and  economic
characteristics of the societies which it serves or rules) that were becoming available to
the tsarist state, and statistical agencies expanded proportionately to the need to gather
accurate  and comprehensive  information on commerce  and agriculture.6 Troinitskii’s
father and grandfather were thus among the bureaucrats who played a crucial part in the
modernization of the tsarist state.
4 Aleksandr Nikolaevich Troinitskii (1869‑ ?) himself entered the Ministry of the Interior
after graduating from the Imperial School of Jurisprudence in 1891 and served at various
positions in Olonets, Chernigov, Orël, and Stavropol´ provinces, as well as at the land
department (zemskii otdel) of the ministry, where he participated in the work on the
1897 census.7 He became vice‑governor of Tobol´sk province in May 1902, and governor of
Semipalatinsk  oblast  in  April  1908.8 Earlier,  the  governors  of  Aqmola  (Akmolinsk),
Semipalatinsk, and Torghay (Turgai) oblasts were called military governors, and army
generals and officers were appointed to these posts. But an amendment to the statute for
the administration of the Steppe oblasts in 1908 changed these military governorships to
ordinary  ones,  and  Troinitskii  became  the  first  civilian  to  work  as  Semipalatinsk
governor.9 The change from military to civilian rule might seem to indicate relaxation of
control, but the fact was the opposite.
5 Troinitskii’s tenure in Semipalatinsk coincided with a crucial period of the political and
cultural history of Kazakhstan. While prominent Russian‑educated Kazakh intellectuals
first appeared as early as the mid‑nineteenth century (most notably, Shoqan Wälikhanov
and Ibrahim Altïnsarin), and the stratum of culturally active intellectuals was formed
toward the end of the century,10 it was during the Revolution of 1905 that Kazakhs began
their political activities in earnest. They organized demonstrations and rallies in various
cities and towns, and among others, the rally of June 1905 in Qarqaraly (Semipalatinsk
oblast)  adopted  a  petition,  signed  by  12,767 people,  criticizing  the  government’s
interference into religious affairs and the policy of Russification and colonization.11 A
number  of  intellectuals,  including  the  future  leader  of  the  Alash  Orda  autonomous
government, Älikhan Bökeykhanov (1866 ?‑1937), were elected to the First and Second
State Dumas. In June 1907, however, the Kazakhs and other Central Asians were deprived
of voting rights to the State Duma, and the Russian authorities strengthened pressure on
political  activists.  Kazakh intellectuals  temporarily  waned,  but  soon revitalized  their
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cultural and social activities with political connotations : the number of books in Kazakh
rapidly  grew,12 and  the  magazine  Ay‑qap  (1911‑1915)  and  the  newspaper  Qazaq
(1913‑1918) began to be published. How did Troinitskii’s oppressive policy react to and
influence  this  renewed  surge  of  Kazakh  intellectuals’  activities,  which  eventually
developed into the autonomous movement of 1917 ?
6 In  this  paper,  we  begin  by  describing  the  repression  of  Kazakh  intellectuals  under
Troinitskii and their reactions. Then we scrutinize Troinitskii’s ideas, perceptions, and
personality through his official reports and personal letters. Through these examinations,
we aim at  elucidating the mechanism of  repression,  in which personal  and systemic
factors  intertwined  and  which  reflected  generally  segregated  but  partly  collusive
relations  between  the  Russian  bureaucracy  and  Kazakh  society.  Finally,  the  paper
demonstrates the paradoxical effects of repression on the Kazakh national movement.
7 As other  papers  of  this  volume show,  studies  of  Kazakh officials  have recently  been
developing,  but  curiously  enough,  researchers  still  know little  about  Russian  higher
officials  in the Kazakh Steppe,  and this  paper aims at  filling this  blank.  We also use
sources related to Troinitskii’s previous workplace, Tobol´sk province, both because his
experiences there are important for understanding his activities in Semipalatinsk, and
the administrative institutions and practices in the Kazakh Steppe were closely related to
those  of  Siberia  –  unofficially,  Aqmola  and  Semipalatinsk  oblasts  were  often  called
Siberia.  This  paper  is  an  attempt  to  connect  the  history  of  the  Kazakh Steppe  with
Siberian  and  Russian  imperial  history,  at  the  same  time  underlining  the  agency  of
Kazakhs themselves.
 
The case of Aqbaev : The persecuting governor and
the petitioning intellectual
8 The first major case of repression was that of Yaqub Aqbaev, a lawyer who graduated
from the faculty of law of St. Petersburg University in 1903 and worked at the Omsk
appellate  court  (sudebnaia  palata)  and  other  judicial  organs  until  his  resignation  in
November 1905. During the 1905 Revolution, he actively participated in demonstrations
and writing petitions to the tsar and the government, including the above‑mentioned
Qarqaraly petition. He especially became famous by his enthusiastic speeches at rallies in
Pavlodar and Qarqaraly in November.  After  being arrested but  acquitted in 1906,  he
worked  as  an  assistant  attorney  (pomoshchnik  prisiazhnogo  poverennogo),  writing
solicitations and complaints to the authorities on behalf of local residents.13
9 In  November  1908,  Troinitskii  wrote  to  the  governor‑general  of  the  Steppe,
Evgenii Shmit,14 that Aqbaev, appealing to people for disobedience to power, behaved like
a mini‑tsar (tsarëk) of the steppe, which could be seen as a sign of weakness of power to
the “semi‑barbaric” inhabitants  and was especially  dangerous for  a  region bordering
China. He asked the governor‑general to banish Aqbaev to a remote corner of Aqmola
oblast  and then to  request  the  minister  of  the  Interior  to  banish  him to  a  faraway
province  in  Siberia  for  five  years.  Responding  to  this  request,  the  governor‑general
banished Aqbaev to Omsk uezd (district) in Aqmola oblast (not a remote place, actually)
and asked the minister to further banish him to Yakut oblast. The minister, however,
decided to let him live under surveillance in a place he selected except St. Petersburg,
Moscow and the capital  provinces as well  as the Governor‑Generalship of  the Steppe
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(Semipalatinsk and Aqmola oblasts) for two years. Aqbaev left Omsk in February 1909 and
headed to Qapal in Semirech´e oblast.15 This means that he went to a Kazakh town much
closer to the Chinese border than his native Qarqaraly, despite Troinitskii’s argument
about the danger of his presence in a border region.
10 Versed in Russian law and with high political awareness, Aqbaev was not silent. Just then,
an  inspection  was  going  on  led  by  Count Pahlen  for  the  purpose  of  reforming  the
administration of the Turkestan region including Semirech´e,16 and Aqbaev sent Pahlen a
long  petition  of  seventy‑three  pages  in  April  1909.17 He  thought  that  he  had  been
banished because of secret denunciations by local officials, including a former peasant
captain (krest´ianskii nachal´nik – see below about this position) – Tsylov, a tax inspector
– Panfilov, a former interpreter for the uezd police office – Bekmetev, the secretary of the
uezd peasant captains’ conference – Chanchikov, and a number of volost (canton) heads,
who resented his exposure of their wrongdoings. Aqbaev described their corruption and
dissolute  life  in  detail,  in  a  garrulous  manner.  He  specifically  pointed  out  systemic
corruption related to elections of volost heads : candidates (Kazakhs) bribed the peasant
captain  (usually  a  Russian)  and  his  companions,  and they  together  manipulated  the
numbers of voters and vote results.18
11 Aqbaev also believed that Troinitskii used the secret denunciations only as a pretext and
that the real  reasons for the banishment were his  complaint  against  Filippov,  whom
Troinitskii invited from Tobol´sk province to the post of peasant captain as the successor
to  fired  Tsylov,19 as  well  as  Aqbaev’s  political  influence  in  local  society.  He  noted
insightfully  that  if  the  Semipalatinsk governor  had been General Galkin  (Troinitskii’s
predecessor),20 he would have lived peacefully at home and would not have dreamt of
becoming a candidate for exile to Yakut oblast. He sarcastically noted that it was clear
that he had fallen victim to a “fetishistic” need for maintaining the prestige of power.
12 The  petition,  which  Aqbaev  wrote  with  abundant  vocabulary  and  such  extravagant
expressions as “believing in the ultimate triumph of the moral unity of humankind on the
basis of the teachings of Jesus Christ” (although he was apparently a Muslim) in order to
appeal to the sense of justice of the Russian state, proved ineffective. Semipalatinsk oblast
was not an object of Pahlen’s inspection, and the petition was forwarded and entrusted
for handling to Troinitskii through the governor‑general of the Steppe. Troinitskii sent
inquiries  to  the  officials  named  in  Aqbaev’s  petition,  who  naturally  denied  the
accusations. It is noteworthy, however, that Kamenshchikov, a former chief of Qarqaraly
uezd, confessed that Abdul‑Azii Bekmetev – the police interpreter who was a relative of
Aqbaev’s wife and whom Aqbaev named as one of his slanderers – was his secret agent.
Bekmetev, a member of a reputed Tatar merchant family in Qarqaraly, was formally a
sympathizer  of  the  Constitutional  Democratic  Party  (Kadets),  but  fearful  of  being
banished by the uezd chief, became his agent and began to provide information against
Aqbaev.21 Here we can observe how officials exploited complex human relationships in
local  society  and  fear  of  oppression  to  collect  information  and  frame  up  politically
troublesome people.
13 Aqbaev  and  his  family  did  not  give  up.  From  the  beginning,  his  mother  and  wife
petitioned to the governor‑general not to banish him, the only breadwinner of the family
and a sick person, to no avail.22 When Aqbaev was banished to Omsk uezd, they wrote to
Aqmola  governor  that  he  had  been  victimized  by  false  denunciation  by  Kazakhs
supported by some chief officials, arguing, “Your Excellency knows the morals of steppe
Kazakhs down to the smallest details and the value of their denunciations and slanders.”23
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Later, the mother seems to have written directly to the Ministry of the Interior that she
was  fatally  ill,  and in  October  1909,  Acting  Governor‑General  Tikhmenev (in  Shmit’s
absence)  asked  the  Semirech´e  governor  to  release  Aqbaev  temporarily.  However,
Troinitskii wrote to Shmit that Aqbaev’s coming to Qarqaraly was highly undesirable as
he had not ceased anti‑government activities, and that his mother was simply fat and had
no fatal illness. Shmit canceled the release and Troinitskii sent Aqbaev, who had already
arrived in Qarqaraly, back to Qapal.24
14 In January 1910, receiving Aqbaev’s own petition, the chief of Qapal uezd interceded for
shortening the period of his banishment, arguing that his behavior was impeccable, and
the Semirech´e military governor supported this.25 Nevertheless, in February the same
year, the minister of the Interior prohibited nine Kazakhs including Aqbaev from residing
in the Governor‑Generalship of the Steppe and Semirech´e and Torghay oblasts for two
years.26 This can be regarded as Troinitskii’s partial victory : Aqbaev went to Troitsk in
Orenburg province, now far from Chinese borders but still adjacent to the Kazakh Steppe.
27
 
The cases of Baytŭrsïnov, Tögísov, and Dulatov :
Different interactions and different results
15 When Aqbaev was still in the middle of his struggle for returning home, in July 1909,
another prominent intellectual, Akhmet Baytŭrsïnov was arrested in Qarqaraly. A poet
and  former  school  principal,  he  was  accused  of  anti‑government  agitation  and
separatism. His wife wrote to the governor‑general of the Steppe that he must have been
arrested on the basis of false information given to the authorities by Kazakhs motivated
by factional feud, and asked the governor‑general to put her husband on trial promptly if
he was a criminal, otherwise release him. Troinitskii, however, objected to the release.
Baytŭrsïnov’s alleged wrongdoings, enumerated by the governor, were the following : he
had launched a campaign for the return of Aqbaev ; he propagated the idea of autonomy,
claiming that China and Afghanistan would support Kazakhs if they stood up ; he told
Kazakhs that Russians were not worth fearing, as only Cossacks had remained loyal to the
tsar ;  he instigated people not  to pay taxes ;  he tried to instill  hostility  between the
Russians and the Kazakhs.28
16 Calls for Baytŭrsïnov’s release spread to the imperial capital in November, with State
Duma deputy Nikolai Skalozubov (1861‑1915)29 appealing to the Ministry of the Interior,
and  Sovremennoe  slovo,  а  newspaper  close  to  the  Constitutional  Democratic  Party,
publishing an article “Kazakh national poet in prison” (Kirgizskii narodnyi poet v tiur
´me).30 All these appeals were in vain, and after sitting in jail without being indicted until
February 1910,  Baytŭrsïnov,  like Aqbaev,  was prohibited from residing in the Steppe
oblasts and settled in Orenburg.
17 In  Ust‑Kamenogorsk  uezd,  situated  in  the  eastern  part  of  Semipalatinsk  oblast,
Kölbay Tögísov (figuring in Russian sources as Telengutov) was arrested in August 1909.
He was an unlicensed lawyer and former interpreter and secretary of justices of the peace
in neighboring Zaysan uezd, and had joined the demonstrations in Qarqaraly in 1905
together with Aqbaev,  Baytŭrsïnov and others.  After the arrest,  Tögísov and his wife
immediately petitioned to Shmit, the governor‑general of the Steppe, for his release. He
surmised that the chief of Zaysan uezd had asked the chief of Ust‑Kamenogorsk uezd to
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arrest him in revenge for the dismissal of Chernavin, a peasant captain against whom
Tögísov had brought a charge to the governor‑general.31
18 Troinitskii, in the meantime, wrote to Shmit that Tögísov, connected with “extreme‑left
parties” and reputed as an influential and omnipotent man among the “dark masses,” had
committed  crimes  such  as  instigation  of  land  disputes  and  non‑payment  of  taxes,
obstruction to settlement of  Russian migrant peasants and sedentarization of  Kazakh
nomads, and applications for Chinese citizenship. In evidence of Tögísov’s threat to social
order, Troinitskii referred to the resolutions of Kazakh and Cossack residents to deport
him.  Practically  accusing  Shmit,  Troinitskii  also  noted  that  Tögísov’s  prestige  had
especially  increased  after  the  governor‑general  fired  Chernavin  in  response  to  his
complaint. Emphasizing the dangers Tögísov could cause in the oblast bordering China,
including even the possibility of an armed revolt of Kazakhs, Troinitskii asked Shmit to
request  the  minister  of  the  Interior  to  exile  him to  Yakut  oblast  for  five  years,  as
banishment  to  Semirech´e  or  Aqmola  oblast  was  useless  (he  probably  had  in  mind
Aqbaev’s case).32
19 Troinitskii apparently expected that his enumeration of Tögísov’s activities that posed a
threat  to  Russian  rule,  security,  and  the  prioritized  policy  of  Russian  peasant
resettlement would be convincing for higher officials but he was mistaken this time. The
governor‑general  of  the  Steppe  ordered  Tögísov’s  release  in  November  1909  on  the
grounds that the case was dismissed for lack of evidence. The order was apparently issued
pursuant to a petition that a Cossack sent to the minister of the Interior. This Cossack was
one  of  the  initiators  of  a  village  meeting  resolution  that  Tögísov  be  deported  –  a
resolution that  Troinitskii  used as a key argument for his  banishment.  However,  the
Cossack asked the minister to invalidate the resolution because he had been deceived by
the peasant captain Kholmskii, who boasted that he could easily influence his friend’s,
Troinitskii’s,  judgment – a  friend with whom he had worked and drunk in the past.
Tögísov, in turn, also sent a petition to the minister of the Interior in which he suggested
that  Troinitskii’s  judgment  was  biased,  stating that if  the  latter  and Kholmskii  were
indeed good friends, “I do not expect any mercy from Mr. Troinitskii. Therefore I humbly
ask Your Excellency to immediately deport me from Semipalatinsk oblast,” and repeated,
“I am not guilty.” Troinitskii asserted that the Cossack and Tögísov had teamed up in the
prison where they both sat, but could not change the governor‑general’s order.33
20 Tögísov was arrested and jailed some time later, and in July 1912, one month before the
end of his prison term, the question arose as to where he should reside after his release.
Tögísov wanted to live in Qapal. Troinitskii pointed out that Qapal was connected with
Semipalatinsk oblast by roads – and that Aqbaev had returned to Qarqaraly from Qapal
unnoticed by the police,  and requested the governor‑general  of the Steppe to banish
Tögísov to Yakut oblast, or at least to Yenisei province, for five years. Shmit refused,
referring to Interior Ministry circulars of 1909 and 1911 limiting administrative exile to
exceptional cases, and allowed Tögísov to live in Qapal.34
21 Mir‑Yaqub Dulatov was arrested later than the above‑mentioned three, in June 1911, on
the charge of inciting discontent with the government among the Kazakh population and
of  lese‑majesty  in  his  collection  of  poems,  Awake,  Kazakh !35 Although  he  lived  in
Petropavlovsk in Aqmola oblast, he was arrested in Semipalatinsk when he visited the
city. The arrest was carried out by Levanevskii, assistant chief of the Omsk Gendarme
Directorate  (who resided in Semipalatinsk),  following an information by the chief  of
Qarqaraly uezd about the book’s circulation among the Kazakhs in the uezd.36 According
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to Troinitskii and Levanevskii, an interpreter at the governor‑general’s chancellery had
earlier  found  this  book  legitimate,37 thereby  accusing  the  Semipalatinsk  governor’s
interpreters of producing a biased and distorted translation, but the Kazan Provisional
Committee on the Press banned the book, recognizing it criminal. Dulatov was let out on
bail and returned to Petropavlovsk, but Troinitskii sent him back to Semipalatinsk.38
22 Although the above‑mentioned episode on the collision between interpreters suggests
that Troinitskii and his subordinates began to view Awake, Kazakh ! as a criminal book
earlier  than others,  there is  no evidence of  the governor’s  further effort  to severely
punish Dulatov, probably because the latter, non‑resident of Semipalatinsk oblast, was
not entangled in local intrigues and secret denunciations. However, because of his book’s
huge influence and resonance among the Kazakhs, Dulatov could not escape persecution.
He  was  convicted  in  court,  and  after  being  released  from  prison  in  1912,  lived  in
Orenburg. There he and Baytŭrsïnov launched the newspaper Qazaq in cooperation with
Bökeykhanov, who had also been prohibited from living in the Steppe oblasts and resided
in Samara.39
23 These  four  cases  of  repression  demonstrate  Troinitskii’s  habit  of  detaining  Kazakh
intellectuals for a long time without trial and of trying to banish them to remote places
like  Yakut  oblast.  Political  oppression  was  common  in  the  Russian  Empire,  and  the
governor‑general  of  the Steppe supported Troinitskii  at  the beginning,  but  gradually
became  aware  that  many  of  his  requests  were  excessive  and  unfounded, and  often
connected with the interests of his henchmen. The Ministry of the Interior also reacted
with caution,  although Troinitskii  did not  stop seeking to inflict  harsh punishments.
Kazakh  intellectuals  and  their  families  actively  petitioned  to  the  authorities  and
sometimes could win some officials’ sympathy. They commonly argued that the arrests
were based on false information (even appealing to officials’ stereotyped notion about the
Kazakhs’ inclination to factional strife and slander), and noted Troinitskii’s key role in
oppression. People he targeted could not entirely escape oppression, but there were also
legal mechanisms and human factors that mitigated it to some extent.
 
Entanglement of bureaucracy and Kazakh society, and
Troinitskii’s experiences in Tobol´sk
24 Complicated processes and different results of the persecution of Kazakh intellectuals
reflected the characteristics of bureaucratism in late imperial Russia. On one hand, there
still remained ample scope for administrative discretion. As Jane Burbank puts it,  the
“manipulation  of  rights  was  a  foundation  of  Russian  administrative  practice  and  a
characteristic behavior of even humble bureaucrats,”40 and satisfaction or rejection of
petitions (a major tool in Russia for the rulers to learn the needs of the people and for the
ruled to address grievances41) much depended on individual officials, so Troinitskii could
strongly affect the fates of the inhabitants of the oblast. On the other hand, final decisions
on more or less important matters needed approval of higher officials (in this case, the
governor‑general)  and  the  central  office  of  the  ministry.  Bureaucratic  principles  of
procedure (not  necessarily  corresponding to  principles  of  rule  of  law)  and collective
common sense could sometimes prevent unfounded or unlawful persecutions.
25 Dependence of the level of persecutions on the individual characters of the governors,
and  especially  the  stark  change  that  occurred  when  Troinitskii  replaced  Galkin  (as
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Aqbaev suggested), can be confirmed by other sources. An ethnographer and deputy of
the First  and Second State Dumas elected from Semipalatinsk oblast,  Nikolai Konshin
(1864‑1937) noted differences among previous military governors of Semipalatinsk oblast
in his memoirs written in the Soviet period : Aleksandr Protsenko (1878‑1883) was liberal
by the then standards, and under him and Vasilii Tseklinskii (1883‑1887), the treatment of
exiles was much softer than in other areas of Siberia. The treatment was especially harsh
under Orest Shchetinin (1887‑1891) and Ivan Sokolovskii (1901‑1903), but even compared
to them, Troinitskii treated exiles “with extreme hatred.” In contrast, Konshin remarked,
Galkin was liberal, disliked gendarmes, and often mitigated oppression.42
26 The chief of the Omsk directorate of gendarmerie Ielita‑fon‑Vol´skii’s report to the police
department of the Ministry of the Interior in 1907 testifies Konshin’s observation : 
Galkin,  playing  for  popularity  and  flirting  with  revolutionaries,  as  I  am  deeply
convinced, by no means embodies the firm monarchical power, and unwittingly,
without  being  aware  of  it,  promotes  the  development  of  the  revolutionary
movement in Semipalatinsk. He once told me with conviction that there was no
reason to persecute organizers of strikes [… and] that the Corps of Gendarmes was a
superfluous organ in Russia costing much money. All this taken together hampers
the work of my assistant in the city of Semipalatinsk, Captain Levanevskii.43 
27 Later, during the revolt of 1916, Galkin as Syrdarya military governor took a soft line
towards the Muslim population, opposing the plan to defend ethnic Russian villages by
military units and denouncing violence of a punitive detachment, and was soon sacked by
the Turkestan governor‑general, Aleksei Kuropatkin.44
28 Konshin also noted that in contrast to Galkin, Troinitskii had been known as an “enemy of
liberation movements”  since  his  tenure  as  vice‑governor  of  Tobol´sk  province,45 and
cracked down not only on Kazakhs but also on liberals among Russian former exiles in
Semipalatinsk oblast. For example, enraged at seeing a curtain with the inscription “Long
live  liberty”  and  quotations  from  the  October  Manifesto  in  the  people’s  house  of
Ust‑Kamenogorsk, Troinitskii ordered the police to burn the curtain and branded the city
as  a  nest  of revolutionaries  in his  explanatory note to the police department of  the
Ministry of the Interior, although Governor‑General Shmit pointed out the absence of
facts proving Troinitskii’s assertion. Numerous police officers he brought from Tobol´sk
to Semipalatinsk framed up innocent people and engaged in bribery, torture and rape ;
this was especially the case in the investigation department (sysknoe otdelenie) opened
in 1909 by Troinitskii’s efforts.  Vice‑governor Grigorii Abaza investigated the offenses
despite  obstructions,  and  the  police  officers  were  put  on  trial  and  sentenced  to
imprisonment. Konshin also referred to Troinitskii’s abomination during drinking and his
relations with women.46
29 As  petitions  of  persecuted  Kazakh  intellectuals  show,  the  police  often  used  secret
denunciations  by  local  people,  whose  motives  were  entangled  with  complex  human
relations in Kazakh society aggravated by elections. The institution of popularly elected
heads of volosts and villages as well as judges in customary courts was introduced in
Central Asia in the late 1860s, on the model of a similar institution introduced in Russian
rural areas some years earlier by the Great Reforms, but elections soon became the venue
of factional strife and vote buying.47
30 Remarkably, petitions of Aqbaev and Tögísov suggest that corruption in elections deeply
involved Russian officials, especially peasant captains. The institution of peasant captains
was an analogue of land captains (zemskii nachal´nik), established in European Russia in
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1889 to supervise rural administration and judiciary in an uchastok (subdivision of an
uezd).  Peasant  captains,  introduced  in  Siberia  in  1898,  had  broader  administrative –
although narrower judicial – powers (and more opportunities for corruption) than land
captains, and substantially undermined peasant self‑administration. In ethnically mixed
areas,  they  supervised  both  natives  and  Russians  (including  a  large  number  of  new
immigrants),  reflecting  the  aim  of  this  institution  to  unify  the  ethnically  divided
administrative  systems  and  to  promote  Russification  (obrusenie)  and  colonization.48
Maksim Taube, the governor‑general of the Steppe, repeatedly requested the tsar in his
annual reports for 1897, 1898, and 1899 to extend the institution of land captains to the
Steppe oblasts,49 and peasant captains were finally introduced in Aqmola, Semipalatinsk,
Torghay, and Ural´sk oblasts in 1902.
31 The system of  appointment  of  land captains  from among the  local  nobility  was  not
applicable to peasant captains because of the lack of landed nobility in Siberia and the
Kazakh Steppe.  While  in  Western  Siberia  the  majority  of  the  peasant  captains  were
former officials for peasant affairs (chinovnik po krest´ianskim delam) and presumably
knew  the  region  well,  many  of  the  peasant  captains  in  Eastern  Siberia  came  from
European Russia, often to make easy money or to escape from debt.50 Although we do not
have collective biographical data of peasant captains in the Steppe oblasts, we can well
assume that the situation was similar to Eastern Siberia due to the absence of former
officials for peasant affairs (except Aqmola oblast, where this position was introduced in
189451).  According to Aqbaev,  the peasant captain Tsylov was a former officer of  the
St. Petersburg river  police,52 and Tögísov’s  petition suggests  that  the peasant  captain
Kholmskii  had worked with Troinitskii  in Tobol´sk or some other place.  It  is  easy to
imagine that Troinitskii’s use of people with material interests but few knowledge of the
region as his agents in localities aggravated corruption and mismanagement.
32 Troinitskii  was  a  strong  advocate  of  the  institution  of  peasant  captains  even before
coming to Semipalatinsk. When local committees under the Special Conference on the
Needs of Agricultural Industry were organized almost all over the Russian Empire by the
initiative of Finance Minister Sergei Witte in 1902‑1903, the Tobol´sk province committee
recommended, among others,  introduction of zemstvos (local self‑government bodies)
and a halt of peasant captains’ interference in economic and agricultural activities of
rural communities. Officials and experts pointed out that many peasant captains were not
versed in agricultural management and their interference damaged initiatives of peasants
and rural communities, and that the work of peasant captains depended too much on
their  individual  zeal  and  preferences,  without  guarantee  of  continuity  of  their
undertakings  after  personnel  changes.  However,  Troinitskii  dissented,  writing  that
zemstvos  were not  suitable  to  Tobol´sk province,  where peasants  were illiterate  and
underdeveloped, and would be dominated by wealthy peasants and extortioners (kulaki i
miroedy) ;  land  and  peasant  captains,  possessing  firm power  and  being  close  to  the
people, had a mission to take care of peasants, who had been deprived of the landlords’
care after the Emancipation Reform of 1861 and left prey of extortioners. He claimed that
land captains were useful  even for highly developed peasants in Stavropol´  province,
where he worked previously.53 Judging from the digest of the local committees’ works by
the statistician Aleksandr Kaufman, Troinitskii’s opinion on these two issues were minor
not only in Tobol´sk province but in the whole Siberia.54
33 Troinitskii’s reliance on coercion seems to have been strengthened by his experiences in
Tobol´sk  province during the Revolution of  1905.  At  that  time,  due to  the illness  of
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Governor Aleksandr Lappo‑Starzhenetskii, Troinitskii had to cope with demonstrations,
strikes, and peasant and prison disturbances as acting governor, and was also appointed
acting temporary governor‑general in four uezds of the oblast where martial law was
imposed in December 1905.55 He strongly relied on coercion and repeatedly asked the
army for permission to use local military units and dispatch of new troops, expressing his
intention of “vigorous suppression of the riots that are disturbing the entire city under
my personal  leadership.”  After  the new governor,  Nikolai Gondatti,56 arrived in April
1906, Troinitskii continued efforts to suppress disorder under the governor’s direction.57
 
Troinitskii’s ideas, perceptions, and emotions seen
from his reports and letters
34 In this section, we further explore perceptions and ideas that formed the background to
Troinitskii’s relentless persecution of Kazakh intellectuals. First, we examine his annual
reports to the emperor to learn his policy and view of the situation of the oblast.
35 In his  reports,  Troinitskii  repeatedly wrote about the necessity of  increasing Russian
immigrants in order to strengthen “Russian elements” in Semipalatinsk oblast, a border
region, and also of promoting the settlement of Kazakh nomads. This was in line with the
state’s policy (especially under Pëtr Stolypin) of promoting peasant migration aimed at
resolving land shortage in central Russia and spatial Russification of Central Asia, and of
confiscating the nomads’ land for distribution to immigrants. Troinitskii’s perception of
the  particular  importance  of  this  policy  in  border  regions  served  as  a  basis  for  his
assertion that people like Tögísov who could hinder settlement and immigration had to
be exiled.
36 His perception of the necessity of strengthening “Russian elements” in border regions
was  also  linked  with  his  distrust  of the  Kazakhs,  an “insidious  and  hostile  people.”
According to him, they tended to take sides with winners in international conflicts as
observed during the Russo‑Japanese War,58 had repeatedly migrated between Russia and
China, and were totally untrustworthy as inhabitants of border regions. He thought that
the  situation would  completely  change if  a  solid  network of  Russian villages,  whose
residents  would  carefully  monitor  the  movement  of  enemy  forces,  would  cover  the
border with China. “Russian simple peasants from among immigrants are well aware of
all the importance of populating border zones, and understand that this is a matter of
state importance,” he wrote, clearly showing his perception of a great difference between
ethnic Russians and Kazakhs in their consciousness of belonging to the Russian state.59
37 Troinitskii  sometimes  openly  expressed  his  prejudice  against  Kazakhs,  asserting,  for
example, “Kazakhs are terribly cunning, deceitful, imbued with the spirit of litigiousness,
slander, perjury and false reports. No oath they make can impel them to tell the truth.”60
This prejudice was combined with anxiety about the difficulty of grasping the situation in
the local society and the possibility of subversion of power. He wrote, “There is no power
in localities.  Kazakhs are getting impudent,  feeling themselves as  full  masters of  the
steppe, stealing cattle and horses from Russians, and even making attacks on officials.”61
38 Troinitskii also expressed this anxiety in his letter to governor‑general Shmit when he
objected to Aqbaev’s return to Qarqaraly, arguing that the police could not keep watch on
all the Kazakhs’ propaganda activities : “What is being done in the steppe, what they say
and what they are plotting is completely unknown to me because of the shortage, or
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rather  absence of  police.”62 Troinitskii  and other  high officials  in  the  Steppe oblasts
repeatedly requested the central government to increase the police and administrative
personnel,63 but  the  increase  was  slow.  Troinitskii’s  lack  of  confidence  in  his  own
governing ability seems to have strengthened his attitude to crack down on every more
or less suspicious person.
39 At the same time, he thought it desirable to settle Kazakhs and introduce to them the
same  administrative  and  judicial  systems  as  Russians.  This  policy  was  not  based  on
egalitarianism but aimed at eliminating “savage customs” and institutions such as the
customary  law courts,  which  the  Russian  government  had  earlier  established  taking
Kazakh specificities into consideration. He wrote, 
The nomadic Kazakh people rank below settled people in legal development, and […
] if the settled Russian population does not have the right to be tried at its own
elective courts for various offenses and crimes, then this right should by no means
be given to the nomadic population, 
[…] 
the state cannot give the conquered people more rights than to the indigenous
population of the state.64
He boasted that he first made knowledge of spoken Russian a requisite for candidates for
volost management, emphasizing, 
I could not let the main Kazakh representatives of authority, two centuries standing
under Russian rule, be ignorant of the state language.65 
40 As  reasonable  as  this  proposition  may  have  been,  it  could  not  alleviate  Troinitskii’s
anxiety about the difficulty to know what the Kazakhs said among themselves as long as
Russian officials did not understand Kazakh.66
41 Aside from Troinitskii’s views expressed in official documents, we can hear his candid
voice in his personal letters to his parents (in most cases, father, who was then a senator
and the chairman of the statistical council at the Ministry of the Interior), kept in the
Russian State Historical Archives (RGIA) in St. Petersburg. In the letters beginning with
“Dear Papa,” or “Dear Mama,” and ending with “The son who loves you,” he repeated, “I
struggle like a squirrel in a wheel,” “I don’t see help from anyone,” and “I have to work all
alone” despite a tremendous amount of work, because of his subordinates’ laziness. He
especially vilified Vice‑Governor Abaza (“an idle bastard,” “busy with love affairs and
office intrigues”),67 whom he repeatedly attempted to transfer outside the oblast.68 In his
memoirs,  Konshin states that  Abaza investigated misdeeds by police officers working
closely with the governor. Thus, what likely motivated Troinitskii’s hatred for Abaza was
not so much the vice‑governor’s laziness as the fact that his investigation threatened to
undermine Troinitskii’s position.
42 Troinitskii was also discontent with his superior Shmit and the Governor‑Generalship of
the Steppe, which “terribly hinders the development of [our oblast]. It brings no benefit
but  slows  down  and  stops  all  affairs.”  The  view  of  governor‑generalships  as  an
unnecessary administrative layer between the central government and the provinces (or
oblasts) was widespread in the late tsarist period, and the Governor‑Generalship of the
Steppe, composed of only two oblasts (Aqmola and Semipalatinsk) after Semirech´e was
transferred to the Turkestan Governor‑Generalship in 1899, was especially vulnerable to
criticism. Many Russian officials and Kazakh intellectuals would have sympathized with
Troinitskii when he complained in January 1910, “I had to write a lot of papers for him
[the governor‑general], to tell the truth, against myself, to show the raison d’être of his
governor‑generalship.”69 However,  his  sentiment  contradicted  the  position  of  the
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ministry  he  belonged  to :  while  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior  under  Dmitrii Sipiagin
(1900‑1902) argued for abolishing the Governor‑Generalship of the Steppe, the ministry
under  Stolypin  (1906‑1911),  who  preferred  decentralization  of  state  administration,
advocated its preservation and opposed deputies at the State Duma who began discussing
its abolishment in 1908.70 Therefore, Troinitskii must have actually done the paperwork
about  the  governor‑generalship’s  raison  d’être  not  only  for  Shmit  but  also  for  the
ministry.
43 In addition, Troinitskii seemed to have a personal contempt and dislike for Shmit, despite
both being rightists close to the Black Hundreds.71 Accompanying the governor‑general in
inspection tours upset him : “For two days I had to listen to all sorts of nasty things, so I
was  compelled  to  stop  him  rather  sharply.”  Moreover,  a  traditional  pattern  of
civilian‑military conflict could be observed in the relations between the two. When in
1913 an attempt of invasion of the Chinese territory by a Cossack unit failed and the
Russian army had to dispatch troops through slush to confront Chinese cavalry on the
border, Troinitskii complained to his father, 
If they had attached importance to my reports [about the necessity to strengthen
the garrison in Zaysan uezd] in due time, there should not have been such a stupid
situation, but the military cannot bear civilians to touch on military issues.72
44 His  letters  also  reveal  his  prejudices  against  various  groups  of  people.  He  wrote,
“Cossacks are terribly lazy. All  the Irtysh [River] belongs to them, but they even feel
tiring to catch fish.”73 He boastfully depicted his diplomatic discourtesy and contempt for
foreign cultures when a former Chinese governor‑general visited him in July 1912.
Yesterday a Chinese dignitary came to me and brought gifts – five fox pelts,  in
addition to different small  items,  for  instance,  Egyptian cigarettes.  He was very
surprised when I flatly refused to receive the pelts. I had to make gifts also for the
small items. How savage their customs are. When I paid a return visit and brought
him my gifts, he served me excellent tea but put there marmalade with his own
fingers, so I had to ask another cup, saying that the doctor has forbidden me to
drink sweet tea.74
45 For Troinitskii, who was dissatisfied by everything in Semipalatinsk, including even hot
weather,75 the dream was to be transferred to central Russia. As early as September 1909,
one and a half year after his appointment, he wrote to his father, 
Since I have to fight with the shortage of laborious people, sometimes appears to
me a thought, isn’t it better to abandon this savage land and ask for [a transfer to]
European Russia. […] It is high time for me to be closer to you.76 
46 In August 1910, on the eve of the visit of Prime Minister Stolypin and the head of the
Main Administration of Land Management and Agriculture, Aleksandr Krivoshein,77 he
wrote to his father,
Here I have done more than my predecessors did for twenty years or more. […] if
there is an opportunity, I will ask Stolypin for a transfer closer to you. I have been
in  Siberia  already  for  nine  years,  and  I  think  that  working  in  such  an  intense
manner, I have a right to a transfer.78 
47 But he was not successful then, and had to write to his mother in June 1912, “I hope I can
move somewhere closer to you in winter, although there is scant hope on [Minister of the
Interior Aleksandr] Makarov. Possibly Krivoshein will help.”79
48 An article published in the Moscow newspaper Russkoe slovo after Troinitskii’s transfer
also  hints  at  how he  had  tried  to  ingratiate  himself  with  officials  from the  center.
According to the article, despite strange information that Konshin and others had sent to
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Stolypin’s government about Troinitskii’s unlawful police operations and oppression of
Kazakhs, “Petersburg officials, occasionally stopping at Semipalatinsk for inspection, on
their return spoke about the Semipalatinsk governor as the nicest of persons, far from
politics and retaining all the freshness of youthful views.”80
49 Overall,  Troinitskii’s  reports  and  letters  suggest  that  his  relentless  and  aggressive
attitude  to  Kazakh  intellectuals  was  related  to  his  dissatisfaction  with  his  own
circumstances, his contempt and lack of understanding of different peoples and cultures,
and his anxiety about insufficient penetration of administrative and police power into
local society. It is possible that he wanted his oppression of politically active people to
appear as an achievement meriting his transfer to European Russia. He was a despotic
administrator, but of a totally different type from patriarchic rulers such as Kaufman and
Gerasim Kolpakovskii,  the first governor‑general of the Steppe (1882‑1889).  Troinitskii
lacked charisma, had no affection for the land he governed, did not paternalistically care
for the people, and relied on bureaucracy and coercion.
 
Troinitskii’s impact on the Kazakh national movement
50 Information about Troinitskii’s persecution of innocent people and lack of understanding
of culture and education gradually became known to the public in the capital. In addition
to the above‑mentioned efforts  by Skalozubov and Konshin to draw attention of  the
government, the St. Petersburg newspaper V mire musul´manstvo in 1911 reported his
ban  on  meetings  of  Semipalatinsk  Muslims  on  elementary  education,  his  refusal  to
approve  the  statute  of  a  Muslim society  for  enlightenment,  and  the  abolishment  of
scholarships for Kazakh students.81 Nevertheless, he was never punished by the tsarist
authorities and his career was not fundamentally damaged.
51 In early 1914, at last, Troinitskii was appointed as governor of Tula province in central
Russia. This was not only the realization of his longtime wish (although his father, to
whom he hoped to live close, had died the previous year), but also was long‑awaited good
news for people in Semipalatinsk oblast. The above‑mentioned article in Russkoe slovo
reported that Kazakhs, who had put the blame on Troinitskii for misfortunes including
even  the  terrible  jŭt  (massive  death  of  cattle  due  to  harsh  weather  in  winter)  in
1911‑1912, were so delighted by his departure that they sacrificed 600 sheep to God.82
52 Troinitskii’s repression of Kazakh intellectuals was excessive even by the standards of the
Russian Empire, but it surely was a product of its generally oppressive system and official
mind.83 On  the  examples  examined  in  this  paper,  we  can  point  out  the  following
characteristics of Russian rule and interaction between imperial power and its Kazakh
subjects. First, the repression was partly a result of the governors’ lack of confidence in
the strength of their own rule, as they had to administer the vast Kazakh steppe and its
mobile nomadic population with a handful police and administrative personnel, many of
whom lacked proper knowledge about local society and were involved in corruption. The
arrest  of  dubious  people,  even  when  there  was  no  trustworthy  evidence,  was  a
preemptive  measure  against  destabilization.  Second,  there  were  networks  of  secret
informers including Kazakh officials and Tatar interpreters, who provided information
useful to the authorities, at the same time trapping their personal enemies. Third, there
were specific bureaucrats who were especially fond of repressive measures, although the
central  government  had  mechanisms  to  control  them  to  some  extent.  Fourth,  the
oppressed  intellectuals  did  not  remain  passive :  they  knew  well  how  the  Russian
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bureaucracy  worked,  and  actively  petitioned  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior,  the
governor‑general of the Steppe, and deputies of the State Duma to release them or return
them from exile.
53 Ultimately, the repression of Kazakh intellectuals did not stop their social and political
activities. They were banished to cities adjacent to the Steppe region, where they worked
with  Russian  and  Tatar  political  activists,  maintaining  contacts  with  the  Kazakh
population  and  engaging  in  literary  and  journalistic  activities.  Orenburg,  where
Baytŭrsïnov and Dulatov lived, was the capital of Torghay oblast, connected with both
Tashkent and the Volga region by railroads, and where the influential Tatar newspaper
Waqt  and  magazine  Shūrā  were  published ;  Qapal,  where  Aqbaev  and  Tögísov  were
banished, was a focal point of traffic between Vernyi (Almaty) and Semipalatinsk, and the
Kazakh modern Islamic school  “Māmānīya” functioned there ;  Troitsk,  where Aqbaev
lived during his  second exile,  was a city with a significant Tatar population and the
famous modern Islamic school “Rasūlīya,” and where the Kazakh magazine Ay‑qap was
published.84
54 With regard to the effects of oppression, Baytŭrsïnov wrote a highly suggestive article in
1914, right after Troinitskii’s transfer from Semipalatinsk. According to him, Troinitskii
always reminded Kazakhs of their identity, saying, “You are a Kazakh, we are Russians, do
not  forget  it.”  Oppression at  the hand of  governors like Troinitskii  and Strakhovskii
(governor of  Torghay oblast  between 1908 and 1910) rendered the Kazakhs watchful,
tough and vigorous. He further wrote :
I myself have nothing to express to Troinitskii other than gratitude. Because if he
were not  a  man who esteems and values false  slander and secret  denunciation,
there would have been no secret denunciation of me. If there had not been secret
denunciation, I would not have been deported from Qarqaraly to Orenburg. If I had
not been deported to Orenburg, I would have remained in Qarqaraly and could not
have  done  the  work  I  do  now.  I  deem  the  work  I  am  doing  for  all  the  six
million Kazakhs more important than lessons given to only fifty to sixty children.85
55 The work “for all the six million Kazakhs” means publication of Qazaq, an enormously
influential newspaper edited by Baytŭrsïnov with the assistance of Dulatov in Orenburg
and distributed to every corner of the Kazakh Steppe. The newspaper published articles
discussing problems of land, local administration, military, religious, and international
affairs, and also significantly contributed to the development of the Kazakh literature and
language.86 It shaped the ideas and human relations that formed the basis of the political
and social movement in the period of the revolutions of 1917 and the subsequent civil
war. Baytŭrsïnov, Dulatov, Aqbaev and other formerly oppressed intellectuals became
leaders of the Alash Orda autonomous movement between 1917 and 1920,87 while Tögísov
established his own party, Üsh Jüz, in opposition to the Alash Orda. Thus, paradoxically,
Governor Troinitskii stimulated the development of the Kazakh national movement.
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ABSTRACTS
Around 1910, a number of prominent Kazakh intellectuals were arrested in Semipalatinsk oblast.
Governor  Troinitskii  was  deeply  involved  in  their  arrests  and  subsequent  banishments,
employing the police and local informers. This article examines how the governor insisted on
punishing them severely, sometimes even conflicting with his senior, the governor‑general of
the  Steppe,  and  how  the  intellectuals  petitioned  the  authorities  to  release  them.  It  also
scrutinizes Troinitskii’s ideas, perceptions, prejudices, and emotions through his official reports
and  personal  letters.  The  repression  derived  both  from  the  governor’s  personality  and  the
mindset of the Russian authorities in the Kazakh Steppe, especially their lack of confidence in the
strength  of  their  own  rule.  The  banished  intellectuals  engaged  in  literary  and  journalistic
activities in cities adjacent to the steppe, developing the ideas and human relations that formed
the  basis  of  the  future  autonomy  movement.  Paradoxically,  the  oppression  by  Troinitskii
stimulated the development of the Kazakh national movement.
Vers  1910,  un  certain  nombre  d’éminents  intellectuels  kazakhs  fut  arrêté  dans  l’oblast  de
Semipalatinsk.  Le gouverneur Trojnickij  était  largement impliqué dans ces arrestations et les
bannissements  qui  s’ensuivirent,  ayant  recouru  pour  cela  aux  services  de  la  police  et  des
informateurs locaux. L’article examine comment le gouverneur insista pour que les intellectuels
fussent  sévèrement  punis,  entrant  même  en  conflit  avec  son responsable  hiérarchique,  le
gouverneur  général  de  la  Steppe,  et  comment  les  intellectuels  adressèrent  une  pétition  aux
autorités  pour  demander  leur  libération.  Il  passe  aussi  en  revue  les  idées  de  Trojnickij,  ses
perceptions, préjugés et émotions au travers de ses rapports officiels et de sa correspondance
personnelle. La répression résultait tant de la personnalité du gouverneur que de l’état d’esprit
des autorités russes en poste dans la Steppe kazakhe, et plus singulièrement de leur manque de
confiance en la force de leur propre administration. Les intellectuels bannis s’engagèrent dans
des activités littéraires et journalistiques dans des villes limitrophes de la steppe, élaborant les
idées  et  les  relations  humaines  qui  furent  à  la  base  du futur  mouvement  pour  l’autonomie.
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